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THE STAGES OF THE DECLINE OF THE
PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION
DUNCAN KENNEDY t
Success for a legal distinction has two facets. First, it must be
possible to make the distinction: people must feel that it is intui-
tively sensible to divide something between its poles, and that the
division will come out pretty much the same-way regardless of who
is doing it. Second, the distinction must make a difference: a dis-
tinction without a difference is a failure even if it is possible for
everyone to agree every time on how to make it. Making a dif-
ference means that it seems plain that situations should be treated
differently depending on which category of the distinction they
fall into.
When people hold a symposium about a distinction, it seems
almost certain that they feel it is no longer a success. Either people
can't tell how to divide situations up between the two -categories,
or it no longer seems to make a difference on which side- a situa-
tion falls.
The history of legal thought since the turn of the century is
the history of the decline of a particular set of distinctions-those
that, taken together, constitute the liberal way of thinking about
the social world.1 Those distinctions are state/society, public/
private, individual/group, right/power, property/sovereignty, con-
tract/tort, law/policy, legislature/judiciary, objective/subjective,
reason/fiat, freedom/coercion, and maybe some more I'm not think-
ing of. Although these distinctions are not synonymous, they are
all in a sense "the same." By this I mean that it is hard to define
any one of them without reference to all, or at least many of the
others, and that if one understands the common usage of one of
them, one understands, pretty much ipso facto (what a fudge!), all
the others.
Because all the distinctions that constitute the liberal mode
have gone through at least analogous processes of decline, it should
be possible to say something in a general way about the- later stages
f Pxofessor of Law, Harvard University. B.A. 1964, Harvard University; LL.B.
1970, Yale University.
1 See Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's CoInmentaries, 28 BuF1ALo L.
REv. 205, 209-21, 258-61, 286-300, 354-62 (1979); see also Gordon, New De-
velopments in Legal Theory, in THE PoLrrcs oF LAw 281 (D. Kairys ed. 1982);
Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in id. 18.
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of the life history of the group, but so far as I know no one has yet
attempted this task. - What I offer here, writing under the influence
of Al Katz, Mark Kelman, and Fran Olsen,2 is a crude set of guesses
about what such an historical enterprise might turn up. I suggest
that there is an invariant sequence of six stages in a distinction's
passage from robust good health to utter decrepitude. I will use
the public/private distinction to illustrate each stage.
1. Hard Cases with Large Stakes
While a distinction is still in its heyday, there arise cases about
which people disagree passionately, and on whose resolution those
same people believe a great.deal turns. For example, in Osborn v.
Bank of the United States,8 a state official had seized the assets of
the Bank of the United States and the Bank was suing him to get
them back. The eleventh amendment prohibited suits in federal
court against the states. Everyone agreed that you could sue the
state official if he murdered someone (and the federal courts had
some basis of jurisdiction) in spite of the eleventh amendment, and
everyone agreed that the eleventh amendment would bar a suit in
federal court to force the officer to perform a ministerial duty under
state law. But this case was tricky: it "fell in between." Doubly
tricky, because it also raised the question whether the Bank of the
United States was a public or a private institution.4 The stakes
were high because the legality of the Bank was a big political issue,
as was the relationship between the federal and state governments,
as was the relationship between the Whig/Federalist judiciary and
the Jacksonian executive branch of the federal government.5
Hard cases with large stakes engage peoples' energies in the
task of manipulating the distinction, analyzing it, fretting about it.
Hard cases are a sign of health, but they are also an indication that
there may be trouble ahead. The trouble begins with:
2 A. Katz, Studies in Boundary Theory (pt. I): Six Essays on Crime and
Criminal Law (1980) -(unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with University of
Pennsylvania Law Review); Katz, Studies in Boundary Theory: Three Essays in
Adjudication and Politics, 28 BuFFALo L. REv. 383 (1979); Kelman, Interpretive
Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591 (1981); Olsen,
The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform (forthcoming
in 96 HAIIv. L. REv., Spring 1983).
3 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738'(1824).
4 Id. 859-61.
5See A. SuTERLAND, CoNsTrroTONALrsm n' AMEUCA 370-73 (1965); C.
SwISHER, AMERIcAN CoNsrTUToNAL DEVELOPMENT 177-85 (2d ed. 1954).
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2. The Development of Intermediate Terms
The development of intermediate terms means formal recog-
nition that some situations are neither one thing nor another-
neither public nor private-but rather share some characteristics of
each pole, as in the case of private businesses affected with a public
interest (the grain elevators in Munn v. Illinois 8). Another ex-
ample is a governmental entity wholly engaged in a "proprietary
activity," 7 and another would be a private entity engaged in a
"governmental function," such as the owner of the company town
in Marsh v. Alabama.8
The development of intermediate terms is likely to be impor-
tant for two different reasons. First, it probably represents the
emergence of serious conflict about how to characterize'a large
number of hard cases with large stakes, as well as a sense on the
part of the deciding people that they can't just come down cleanly
on one side or the other. Consensus about categorization begins
to break down. Second, it probably means that it is becoming
more difficult to decide what difference it makeshow we categorize
a situation. The intermediate entity gets treated "as though" it
were public for some purposes, and "as though" it were private
for other purposes. This means not only that the institution in
question "falls on the line," but also that the responses that used
to follow, ?t la Pavlov, when I said public or you said private, begin
to lose their all-or-nothing, set-like quality.
3. Collapse
An important and exciting moment in the history of a distinc-
tion arrives when troublemakers begin to argue that the distinction
is incoherent because, no matter how you try to apply it, you end
up in a situation of hopeless contradiction. The form of this argu-
ment is likely to be as follows: you say that something is X if it
has property A, and that it is Y if it has property B. But every-
thing has property A, so everything is X, and the distinction be-
tween X and Y has collapsed.
Some fun examples of this involve the public/private distinc-
tion. Morris Cohen argued that because both property rights and
contract rights were enforced by the state, the so-called rights were
694 U.S. 113, 126-34 (1877).
7 See Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519,
1570-71 (1982) (citing examples).
8 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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really better. conceived as delegated public powers, whose exercise
should be subject to the rules of public accountability we associate
with legislators, rather than with the rules of private accountability
we associate with-what else?-property and contract.9
Another version of the same argument appears in an article by
Robert Hale.'0  Because the government uses force to guarantee
respect for private property, and property determines the distribu-
tion of income, the "free". "private" market is really an artifact of
public violence. Louis Jaffe wrote an article called Law Making
by Private Groups " to show that the National Recovery Act Codes
should have been upheld. So what if they involved massive dele-
gation of lawmaking power to private cartels? Jaffe argued that it
was still less delegation than was implicit in the quintessentially
private institutions of the common law.
In Shelley v. Kraemer12 this collapsing tactic succeeded so well
that it failed. If state enforcement of the property and contract
groundrules of the market was "state action" for fourteenth amend-
ment purposes, then the fourteenth amendment required the states
to outlaw any "private" actor who practiced racial discrimination.
As seems to happen regularly in the collapsing mode, the extreme
consequences that arguably follow from abolition of the distinction
lead people to pull back and resort to:
4. Continuumization
Continuumization means that people see most entities (institu-
tions, actors, actions) as "not absolutely one thing or another,"
rather than reserving this status for a small class of intermediate
terms, or collapsing everything into one pole or the other. With
the exception of polar situations-passing laws or deciding lawsuits
representing the "public" extreme, choosing a toothpaste or making
love representing the "private" extreme-everything is "somewhere
in the middle." However, it seems intuitively fairly easy to range
the things in the middle along a continuum.
Continuumization seems to go along with the disaggregation
of the package of legal responses that once seemed to follow "logi-
9 See M. COHEN, Property and Sovereignty and The Basis of Contract, in LAw
AND THE SociAL ORDER 41 and 69, 102 (1933); see also Brest, State Action and
Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296,
1326-29 (1982).
10 Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
PoL. SC. Q. 470 (1923).
1151 Hauv. L. REv. 201, 211-21 (1937).
12 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
cally" from the choice to categorize an institution one way -or
another. Institutions in the middle should have rules that are '
mixture of public and private modes: for example, sewer districts
should have to observe the constitutional prohibition against tak-
ings without just compensation but not the constitutional requi~i-
ment of one-person/one-vote. 13  In continuum consciousness, the
ideal is a range of legal responses exactly calibrated to the range of
fact situations: an overlay of one continuum on the other.,
People who believe in continua tend to explain how they go
about deciding what legal response is appropriate for a given insti-
tution by listing "factors" that "cut" one way or the other and must
be "balanced." 'The imagery of balancing fits the imagery of
continua because balancing is an affair of fine quantitative grada-
tions, rather than of the qualitative "absolutes" that were dis-
credited during the stage of Collapse. There is now more room
for disagreement, both about how to make the distinction and
about What difference it should make, than there was in an earlier
"simpler" time. But what looked for a moment like abolition -or
transcendence of the distinction during Collapse, turns out not to
have happened. The distinction is dead, but it rules us from the
grave.
5. Stereotypification
The last two stages in the history of the liberal distinctions are
playing themselves out in our own present. They involve the dis:
solution rather than the collapse "of distinctions, and the relaxation
of the iron grip they exert from six feet under.
Stereotypification means that people come to see the overt,
formally rational part of the argument about where an institutioi
fits on the continuum, and about what Mixed package of rules of
procedure it should operate under, as involving the mechanical
manipulation of balanced, pro/con policy arguments that come in
matched pairs.
When the City of Detroit decides to condemn the whole Pole-
town neighborhood and then virtually gives it to an auto company
as a plant site, there is a big argument about whether or not this
is a taking for a "public" or a "private" purpose. 4 Don't you feel,
13 See also Ellickson, supra note 7, at 1542-43 & n'95 (discussing cases).
34 See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304
N.W.2d 455 (1981); see also Crosby v. Young, 512 F. Supp. .1363 (E.D. Mich.
1981) (environmental litigation aspect of Poletown case).
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dear reader, a sensation of ennui, even of sleepiness, at the thought
that I might actually tell you what they said? It's not just that the
arguments are obvious.. It's worse than that. The arguments de-
ployed by Detroit in support.of the publicness of this venture could
be deployed in support, of virtually any venture one can imagine.
If, on the other hand, we take seriously the arguments against
publicness deployed by the lawyers for Poletown, it is hard to
imagine anything except a courthouse that would justify a taking.
. . In a sense, stereotypification is the working out, in the reas-
suring context of continua, of the practical implications of Collapse.
"Legal" arguments prove too much: it just can't be the force of
the formulae we use that causes our conviction that one side or the
other. is right, since .we reject the identical arguments in the next
case. And we have no meta-principle of appropriateness that will
tell us when argument A is right or when, on the contrary, it is flat
wrong and B is right. When a distinction reaches this stage, using
it in legal argument seems a mere exercise: we can do it so well we
can't believe in it any more.
6. Loopification
Loopification is the most interesting (to me) of all the stages,
because it is somewhat hypothetical. I'm quite convinced that
there is something to my description of stages one through five,
but six is more of an attempt to guess why some of us find legal
thought so freakily inadequate. One's consciousness is loopified
when the ends of the continuum seem closer to one another, in
some moods (for some purposes, in some cases), than either end
seems to the middle. Otherwise stated, one's consciousness is loopi-
fled when one seems to be able to move by a steady series of steps
around the whole distinction, ending up where one started without
ever reversing direction. Like wow, man.
In the case of the public/private distinction, loopification oc-
curs when one realizes that the private sector includes both the
market and the family. We often conceive the family in terms
very much like those we apply to the state, and treat the family as a
domain "affected with a public interest" to the very extent that it is
intensely private. Likewise, we tend to understand the transactions
of individual consumers, investors, tenants, and clients as more
private than those of large or small businesses, but at the same time
conceive of these individual transactions as more, rather than less,
amenable to public regulation. All of this produces the following
diagram, meant to be representative of the:
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Loopification of the Public/Private Distinction:,
Very large Small
corporations businesses
Lawyers/doctors Individual
workers
Labor unions Consumeri
Investors
Public utilities Tenants
Clients
Port authorities
School boards Churches
Local government
with home rule Married persons
Legislators
Judges Parents
Executives
My assertion about this diagram is that you can move around it in
a clockwise direction starting at the bottom with the classic state
functionaries-legislators, judges, executives-and ending up with
parents, feeling as you go that you are always moving in the direc-
tion of greater "privateness." Yet at the same time there is a 'sense
in which the sequence eventually brings you back to where you
began.
One ends up where one began because of all the ways in which
we think of the family and the political community as close together
rather than far apart.15 First, there are many analogies between
them. They are both "units of government," rather than markets
(though some law and economics types have recently argued for
15 What follows is heavily indebted to Olsen, supra note 2. My emphasis is
on the meeting of the ends of the continuum rather than on the oddly public/private
nature of modem labor and consumer transactions. On labor, see Klare, The
Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1358 (1982); on
consumers, see Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort
Law, with Special References to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power,
41 MD. L. REv. 563 (1982).
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seeing them otherwise). 16 Within them, actors play roles-occupy
offices or statuses-which are fiduciary. There are lots of duties
and lots of discretion, but neither the duty nor the discretion is
like that of market actors. In the family and in the state, we tend
to feel that overarching ideals ought to inform every decision, while
we conceive the market actor as "free to do whatever she wants so
long as she obeys the groundrules."
Second, political philosophy refers constantly to the. ideals of
the family, and philosophers of the family refer constantly to politi-
cal ideals. The interpenetration of the two realms of discourse is
so thorough that we might better speak of a single political/familial
rhetoric. We use the market concept of consent or voluntariness
only in a qualified, metaphorical, or "implied" sense in state and
family. We temper the notion that you get what you paid for with
natural law, natural right, immemorial custom, organic communi-
tarian norms, divine will, and so forth.'7
Third, the blurring of institutional lines between the state
and the family is more obvious than blurring along the market/
family or market/state boundaries. It has been common forever
to speak of the public functions of the family in producing and
socializing "the next generation." Using this and other rationales,
the state attempts to determine the content of and then enforce
performance of familial roles, both of parents and children. Modem
statutory schemes authorize social welfare agencies backed by courts
to intervene on no more precise grounds than "the best interests
of the child" or the child's "need for supervision." It often seems
that the legislator sees parents as a mere adjunct or subagency of
the state.'8
Finally and paradoxically, when people are speaking and think-
ing of the economy, or "world of work," as the "public sphere,"
they tend to lump politics, religion and sexuality together as an
opposed sphere, into which an employer (for example) has no busi-
ness intruding. In this perspective, what life in the state has in
16 See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCE, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CoNsTrUTIoNAL DmocPAcx (1962); ECONONcS OF THm FA.mLY
(T. Schultz ed. 1974).
17 See J. DEMos, A LrrrLE CommoNwz-O TH: F4mLy Lu'E IN PLYMOUTH
COLONY (1970); Kennedy, supra note 1, at 294-311, 346-50; K. MAR.X, Economic
and Philosophical Manuscripts, in EARLY WarrINGs 154 (T. Bottomore ed. 1964);
S. FIRESTONE, THE DIMACnC OF SEX (1970); MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism,
Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 (1982).
18 See J. DoNZaOT, THE PoLcr.N OF FAMLmES (R. Hurley trans. 1979); Katz
& Teitelbaum, PINS Jurisdiction, the Vagueness Doctrine, and the Rule of Law,
53 INn. L.J. 1 (1977).
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common with life in the family is that both are quintessentially
private.19
Following out these lines of similarity and difference, one
simply loses one's ability to take the 'public/private distinction
seriously as a description, as an explanation, or as a justification
of anything.
Conclusion
The American Bar Foundation should commission an em-
pirical study of the decline of the liberal distinctions, in the hope
of giving precise definition to the stages of decline and establishing
whether they occur in an invariant sequence. The history of the
demise of liberal legalism is too important to leave to guesswork.
19 Cf. Y. Mmx, On the Jewish Question, in EAnLY WnrrmTs, supra note 17,
at 1.
